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In February of 1984, in In re Jadd,) the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts concluded that a residency requirement for attorneys 
seeking admission to the Massachusetts bar on motion violates the 
United States Constitution.2 Accordingly, the court struck down its 
rule3 requiring applicants for admission to the bar on motion to have 
1. 391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984). 
2. Id. at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 761. If the court grants the motion, the Commonwealth 
admits the attorney to the bar. The attorney, therefore, does not have to pass an examina­
tion. Id. at 227 n.l, 461 N.E.2nd at 761 n.1. 
3. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:01 § 6.1.1, as amended, 382 Mass. 698, 755-56 (1981), embod­
ied the requirement. 
Section 6. Admission Without Examination. 
6.1 Attorneys Admitted in Other States. A person who has been admitted 
as an attorney of the highest judicial court of any State, district or territory of the 
United States may apply to the Supreme Judicial Court for admission, without 
examination, as an attorney in this Commonwealth. The Board of Bar Examina­
tions may, in its discretion, excuse the applicant from taking the regular law ex­
amination on the applicant's compliance with the following conditions: 
6.1.1 The applicant's principal residence is in the Commonwealth of Mas­
sachusetts. 
6.1.2 The applicant shall have been admitted in the other State, district or 
territory, for at least five years prior to applying for admission in the Common­
wealth, and shall provide the court with a certificate of admission from the high­
est judicial court of such State, district or territory. 
6.1.3 The applicant shall have so engaged in the practice or teaching oflaw 
since the prior admission as to satisfy the Board of Bar Examiners of his or her 
good moral character and professional qualifications. 
6.1.4 The applicant shall submit to the Board of Bar Examiners letters of 
recommendation for admission from three members of the bar of the Common­
wealth, or of the State, district or territory of prior admission, or of the bar of the 
State, district or territory in which the applicant has last resided. 
6.1.5 The applicant shall have graduated from high school, or shall have 
received the equivalent education, in the opinion of the Board, completed work 
for a :bachelor's degree at a college or university, or its equivalent, and graduated 
from a law school which at the time of graduation, was approved by the Ameri­
can Bar Association. 
Following its decision in In Re Jadd, the supreme judicial court amended the rules. The 
amended rules require applicants to pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility Exam­
ination and a limited written examination on Massachusetts practice. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:01 
§§ 6.1.1-6.1.6, reprinted in 12 MASS. LAW. WEEK. 1541 (1984) (effective January 1, 1985). 
The rules now provide: 
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their principal residences in the Commonwealth.4 
Robert I. Jadd, a resident of New York and a member of the 
Florida and New York bars, challenged the former rule. s He sought 
admission on motion but the Board of Bar Examiners denied his appli­
cation because he was not a Massachusetts resident. 6 
Jadd argued that the residency requirement violated the privileges 
and immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitu­
tion. 7 The court agreed, basing its decision on two factors. First, it 
6.1.1 The applicant shall have been admitted in the other state, district or 
territory, for at least five years prior to applying for admission in the Common­
wealth, and shall provide the court with certificate of admission from the highest 
judicial court of such state, district or territory. 
6.1.2 The applicant shall have so engaged in the practice or teaching of law 
since the prior admission as to satisfy the Board of Bar Examiners of his or her 
good moral character and professional qualifications. 
6.1.3 The applicant shall submit to the board of Examiners letters of rec­
ommendation for admission from three members of the bar of the Common­
wealth, or of the state, district or territory of prior admission, or the bar of the 
state, district or territory in which the applicant last resided. 
6.1.4 The applicant shall have graduated from high school, or shall have 
received the equivalent education, in the opinion of the Board, completed work 
for a bachelor's degree at a college or university, or its equivalent, and graduated 
from a law school which at the time of graduation was approved by the American 
Bar Association. 
6.1.5 The applicant shall pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility 
Examination if he or she has not previously passed that examination in another 
jurisdiction. 
6.1.6 The applicant shall pass a limited written examination in Massachu­
setts practice and procedure which shall be administered by the Board of Bar 
Examiners. 
Id. 
Justices Wilkins and O'Connor dissented from the adoption of the amendment, voic­
ing concern about the restrictiveness of the rules. Id. 
The supreme judicial court is vested with authority to make and promulgate rules in 
order to regulate the practice of law in the Massachusetts judicial system. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 213, § 3 (West 1958); Raymond, Massachusetts State Court Organization 
Profile, 1979 A.B.A. PUB. at 13. 
4. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 237 n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 766 n.13. For amended rule, see 
supra note 2. 
5. Id. at 227, 461 N.E.2d at 760-61. 
6. Id. at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 761. The Board of Bar Examiners did not advise the 
court whether Jadd met the other requirements of Rule 3:01 section 6. Id. at 228 n.3, 461 
N.E.2d at 761 n.3. See supra note 2. Jadd had only petitioned for a hearing before a single 
justice (Abrams) of the supreme judicial court. Justice Abrams, however, reported the 
matter to the court for decision. Id. at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 761. 
7. Id. at 226, 461 N.E.2d at 761. The court expressed confidence that Jadd's rights 
"probably would be no greater under the commerce clause," so it did not discuss that issue. 
Id. at 228 n.2, 461 N.E.2d at 761 n.2. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), the 
Supreme Court stated that a "mutually reinforcing relationship [exists] between the Privi­
leges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause." Id. at 531. The 
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reasoned that the practice of law constituted a fundamental right for 
purposes of an analysis under the privileges and immunities clause.8 
Second, it found that a sufficient state interest for requiring residency 
for admission to the bar did not exist.9 The court noted that many 
state courts had determined that their own residency requirements 
were unconstitutional. \0 From its analysis of these factors, the court 
eliminated the residency rule. I I The court also concluded that it was 
unnecessary to determine whether an attorney admitted on motion 
was required to take a state bar examination as well as fulfill a resi­
dency requirement. 12 
II. ANALYSIS 
In addressing the plaintiff's claim that the rule violated the Con­
stitution, the court in In Re Jadd focused on the privileges and immu­
nities clause of Article IV which states, "[t]he Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States."13 The court followed the two-step analysis developed 
relationship "sterns from their common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Con­
federation and their shared vision of federalism." Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted). The 
Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation afforded persons of different states the same 
privileges of trade and commerce. Hence, Jadd could have argued that the commerce 
clause under Hicklin requires persons from jurisdictions outside Massachusetts to be af­
forded the same privileges as those held by citizens of Massachusetts regarding admission 
to the Massachusetts bar. 
8. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 228-29, 461 N.E.2d at 761. 
9. Id. at 234-36, 461 N.E.2d at 763-65. 
10. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 230-33, 236, 461 N.E.2d at 762-64. See, e.g., Piper v. 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 98, 
withdrawn, affd. on reh'g., 723 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983), prob. juris. noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149 
(1984); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F.Supp. 155, 158 (D.S.D. 
1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F.Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Sargus v. West 
Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 
620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980); In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 399 N.E.2d 1309,422 N.Y.S.2d 
641 (1979). 
11. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 237 & n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 766 & n.13. For amended 
rule see supra note 2. 
12. Id. at 236-37, 461 N.E.2d at 765-66. 
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The privileges and immunities clause analyzed in 
In Re Jadd should not be confused with the privileges and immunities clause of the four­
teenth amendment which pertains to those rights protected under national citizenship. Ar­
ticle IV, section 2, clause 1, provides protection to citizens in states in which they do not 
reside. Professor Tribe refers to this provision as the "interstate privileges and immunities 
clause." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-32, at 404 (1978). See Note, 
Constitutional Law-The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV: Fundamental 
Rights Revived-Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), 55 WASH. L. 
REV. 461, 463 n.19 (1980). Although the language of the privileges and immunities clause 
only mentions citizens, for the purposes of analysis" 'citizen' and 'resident' are 'essentially 
interchangeable,' " Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (quoting Austin v. New 
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by the Supreme Court.14 First, the court must find that the privileges 
and immunities clause is protecting a fundamental right denied to 
non-residents. 15 Second, the court must decide that "the state has a 
sufficient interest in requiring residency so as to justify the discrimina­
tion."16 If a fundamental right is jeopardized, and the state has a sub­
stantial reason for the discrimination, then the Constitution allows the 
requirement. 17 
The court in In Re Jadd determined that the practice of law is a 
fundamental right since it constitutes "an important commercial act iv­
ity."18 The court based its assessment on conclusions of the United 
States Supreme Court and courts of other jurisdictions. 19 A careful 
examination of Supreme Court interpretations of the privileges and 
immunities clause reveals that a person's right to practice a trade is a 
fundamental right.20 In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,21 the Supreme 
Court recognized that the legal profession may be equated with the 
Hampshire, 437 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975». See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397 
(1948). 
14. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383-84, 388 
(1978). The Baldwin court held that neither the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV 
section 2, nor the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment protect a non-resident's 
right to recreational big-game hunting in Montana. Id. at 388, 391. See Note, supra note 
13, at 463. 
15. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383-384 (1978); see Austin v. 
New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 418, 
430 (1870). 
16. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948). 
17. Id. at 396. 
18. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 230, 461 N.E.2d at 762. 
19. Although the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly stated that the 
practice of law is a fundamental right, an inference that it is can be drawn from the Court's 
analysis in various cases. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977); 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723­
24 (1973). See Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F.Supp. 1064, 1071 
(D.N.H. 1982), rev'd., 723 F.2d 98, withdrawn, affd. reh'g., 723 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983), 
prob. juris. noted, 104 S.Ct. 2149b (1984); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 
530 F. Supp. 155, 158 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173 
(N.D.Ala. 1981); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 444 
(W.Va. 1982); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640, 643 (Ala. 1980); In re Gordon v. 
Commission on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312,422 
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644-45 (1979); But see, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Resi­
dency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 92 
HARv. L. REV. 1461, 1469 & n.45 (1979) (discussing dicta from late nineteenth century 
cases that state that the practice of law is not a fundamental right). 
20. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (right to employment in the oil and 
gas industry); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (right to fish); Ward v. Maryland, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall) 418 (1870) (right to market produce). See Note, supra note 19, at 1468-70. 
21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
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practice of a trade.22 In Bates, the Court reasoned that the legal pro­
fession, though a learned one, does not differ substantially from work 
in which a crafts-person plies a trade. 23 Logically, therefore, the prac­
tice of law acquires the status of a fundamental right. 24 
Similarly, in Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness,25 the 
Court of Appeals of New York declared: 
[T]he right to pursue one's chosen occupation free from dis­
criminatory interference is the very essence of the personal freedom 
that the privileges and immunities clause was intended to se­
cure.... It is now beyond dispute that the practice oflaw, despite 
its historical antecedents as a learned profession somehow above 
that of the common trades, is but a species of those commercial 
activities within the ambit of the clause. . . . From the standpoint 
of both the public and the legal profession itself, the practice of law 
is analogous to any other occupation in which an independent agent 
acts on behalf of a principal. 26 
The court in In Re Jadd qualified its finding of a fundamental right, 
however, by stating that challenges to the residency requirements for 
admission to the bar have not focused on the question of the existence 
of a fundamental right but rather on whether a sufficient state interest 
exists.27 
There are various arguments on behalf of the state interest: the 
residency requirement cultivates knowledge of state law; it allows the 
community to observe moral character; it promotes community re­
sponsibility; and it furthers administrative convenience in attorney-cli­
ent communication, service of process, and administration of the bar 
admission process.28 Courts have found, nevertheless, that the articu­
lated interests provide insufficient grounds for discrimination against 
nonresidents seeking admission to the bar.29 
22. Id. at 371-72. 
23. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72. 
24. Id. 
25. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309,422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979). 
26. Id. at 272, 397 N.E.2d at 1312,422 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45 (citations omitted). 
27. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 231-32, 461 N.E.2d at 763 (1984). See Hicklin v. 
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The Court did not discuss whether a fundamental right had 
been violated. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 
(D.N.H. 1982), rev'd. 723 F.2d 98, withdrawn, a./f'd. on reh'g., 723 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983), 
prob. juris. noted, 104 S.Ct. 2149 (1984). 
28. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See also Special Project, Admission 
to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 665, 776-77 (1981). 
29. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Special Project supra note 28, at 
770. A substantial reason exists if "something to indicate that noncitizens constitute a 
peculiar source of the evil ..." can befound. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). 
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Residency, for example, does not necessarily promote knowledge 
of locallaw. 30 Courts have also rejected the argument that the states 
have a substantial interest in observing the ethical character of appli­
cants since less restrictive alternatives exist such as the nationwide in­
vestigatory service operated by the National Conference of Bar 
Examiners,31 Additionally, courts have decided that administrative 
convenience is an insufficient state interest.32 The court in In Re Jadd 
considered each interest and found it to be insufficient. It therefore 
struck its residency rule.33 
After concluding that the practice of law is a fundamental right 
and that the state did not have sufficient interest to override the right, 
the court turned to the final consideration of whether "the fact that an 
attorney admitted on motion need not take and pass [the] state's bar 
examination make[s] a difference in an analysis of the validity of a 
residency requirement?"34 The court concluded that it does not make 
a difference that nonresident applicants to the Massachusetts bar are 
not required to take a test35 since courts have determined that passing 
a bar examination does not represent "an essential means in assessing 
. . . knowledge of local law or any other qualification for admission to 
the bar."36 In fact, not one recent court opinion that found a resi­
dency requirement unconstitutional considered the distinction an im­
portant factor in its analysis. 37 
III. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts by striking down its residency requirement for ad­
mission to the bar on motion followed precedents set down by the 
Supreme Court and other state courts. By focusing on the residency 
requirement as a violation of the privileges and immunities clause, the 
supreme judicial court followed the lead of other courts: thus, it 
30. See Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155, 159-60 
(S.D. 1982); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 445 (W. Va. 
1982). 
31. See Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 
1970); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440,445-46. See Note, 
supra note 19, at 1488. 
32. See Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155, 160-61 
(D.S.D. 1982); Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241, 245-46 (Alaska 1982); Sargus v. 
West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 445 (W. Va. 1982). 
33. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 236, 237 n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 765, 766 n.13. 
34. Id. at 236, 461 N.E.2d at 765. Cf supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
35. Id. at 236-37, 461 N.E.2d at 765-66. 
36. Id. at 236, 461 N.E.2d at 766. But cf supra note 3. 
37. See Hafter, Toward the Multistate Practice of Law Through Admission by Reci­
procity, 53 MISS. L.J. 1, 39 n.131 (1983). 
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joined the many states that had already set aside their residency 
requirements. 
Many states still impose residency requirements on applicants to 
their bars. As of March, 1983, twenty-eight states still required some 
form of residency for admission on motion,38 and as of January, 1984, 
twenty-nine states required residency of an original applicant to the 
bar.39 In light of the statistics, litigation on the constitutionality of 
residency requirements will continue. 
The highest state courts that have addressed the issue have indi­
cated their disfavor with the various forms of residency requirements. 
By litigating the issue to the highest possible state courts, many in the 
legal profession have also voiced their preference for striking down 
residency requirements judicially. In Re Jadd is one such example. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts, following the major­
ity, struck down its residency requirement. The trend gathers strength 
in favor of the abolition of the rules because of their unconstitutional­
ity. The time has arrived for the United States Supreme Court to de­
cide the issue.4O 
Bruce CherifJ 
38. Id. at 44-47. The following states require residency upon application: Arkansas, 
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis­
souri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin. States 
that require residency from sixty days to six months before application are Connecticut, 
Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont. Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon 
require residency upon admission to the bar. New Mexico requires residence ninety days 
before admission. Id. 
39. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2,3 (1984). 
40. On October 31,1984, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on 
whether a state can prohibit non-residents from becoming members ofthe state bar. Davis, 
N.H. Bases Residency Requirements Faces a Constitutional Challenge, NAT. L. J., Nov. 12, 
1984, at 24, col. 3 (discussing Sup. Ct. of New Hampshire v. Piper, No. 83-1466). On 
March 4, 1985, the Supreme Court decided Piper, Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 53 U.S. Law 
Week 4238 (March 5, 1985). The Court concluded that New Hampshire's bar residency 
requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitu­
tion. Id. at 4232. The Supreme Court first decided that the practice of law was a funda­
mental right protected by the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 4240. Cj supra note 
15 & 18-19 and accompanying text. Because the practice of law is a fundamental right, the 
Court stated that the state could discriminate against nonresidents only if it had "substan­
tial" reasons for its disparate treatment of those nonresidents. Piper, 53 U.S. Law Week at 
4242. Cj supra note 16 and accompanying text. Justice Powell writing for the majority 
found that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire concerns, as to nonresident familiariza­
tion with local rules and procedures, ethical behavior, availability for court proceedings, 
and willingness to perform pro bono work, did not substantially "bear the necessary rela­
tionship to the State's objectives" to justify discrimination against nonresidents. Piper, 53 
U.S. Law Week at 4242. Cj supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Thus, the Supreme 
Court concurred with the sound reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
